The technology associated with UAVs, both lethal and non-lethal, was one area New
World Vistas identified as being critical to the Air Force's ability to chart a future course projecting air power into the 21 st century. Unfortunately, charting an acceptable UAV course for the future has proved illusive to the USAF.
The thesis of this paper is the post-Vietnam USAF has experienced two extremes in developing a course for its UAV efforts. Though initially demonstrating a "hands off course for UAVs, USAF concern over mission loss to sister services led Air Force leadership to change its course and accept UAVs as a possible solution to Air Force needs. However, in its zeal to protect its mission areas, the Air Force embarked with UAVs in a direction inconsistent with the evolution of UAV technology. Consequently, the USAF needs a moderate UAV course founded on proven technology.
In support of this thesis, this paper first provides a chronology of DOD-wide tactical UAV development and acquisition efforts during the 1980s and early 1990s. The purpose of the chronology is twofold. First, the UAV chronology encompasses an abridgement of DOD tactical UAV programs during this timeframe and allows the reader to develop sufficient perspective of-in the authors opinion-the sub-par evolution of UAV capabilities, technology, and development. Second, the chronology depicts a conspicuous lack of USAF involvement in most of these tactical UAV programs suggesting a lack of early interest in UAVs on the part of the Air Force. While a USAF cultural bias away from UAVs certainly provides a viable theory for this early "hands off' approach, proof or disproof of this theory is left to follow-on research.
Next, despite the sub-par performance of previous UAV systems, the paper evidences a mid-1990s new found Air Force interest in UAVs. The paper suggests this USAF interest in UAVs was spurred by a concern over mission loss to other services advocating the use and further development of UAVs.
The timeline continues with four USAF UAV end states, or goals, and two new UAV systems representing the Air Force's new found interest in UAVs as well as a departure from its previous "hands off' UAV approach. The paper outlines the end states as well as describes the means to the end states, Global Hawk and Dark Star UAVs.
Subsequent to this discussion, the paper evidences setbacks in Global Hawk and Dark
Stars development indicating the Air Force's UAV course adjustment spurred by protection of its missions represented a course over-correction founded on less-thanproven UAV technology.
Therefore, the paper finally suggests a more moderate course for future UAV 
Early UAV Development-Where's the USAF
This chapter first explores the 1980 to mid-1990s evolution of UAV acquisition organizations as well as details the development, cost, and limited operational performance of five UAV systems. The five UAV systems, Aquila, Pioneer, Hunter, Medium Range, and Predator, represent an abridgement of DOD tactical UAVs developed during the timeframe and demonstrate-in the authors opinion-an overall pattern of sub-par UAV performance. The systems are covered in considerable detail to provide a thorough assessment of UAV development and to establish an overall pattern of less-than-proven UAV technological development. Second, the chapter elaborates on the conspicuous lack of USAF involvement in most early tactical UAV programs suggesting a reluctance by the USAF to consider UAVs to meet mission needs. While a USAF cultural bias away from UAVs provides a viable theory for this early USAF "hands off' course for UAVs, proof or disproof of this theory is left to follow-on research. Ultimately, this chapter lays the foundation for a follow-on argument that the Air Force later abandoned its "hands off UAV course and accepted UAVs despite lessthan-proven UAV technological development. At the outset, to avoid confusion over UAV definitions, for the purposes of this paper a UAV is defined as a recoverable aerial vehicle-either remotely piloted or autonomously controlled.
UAV Acquisition Organization
Prior to elaborating on individual UAV systems, a brief overview of the UAV acquisition organization provides the context in which the various DOD agencies interact to develop and acquire UAV systems. Aquila, Pioneer, and Medium Range UAVs represented the DODs first major UAV acquisition effort after the Vietnam war. Aquila UAV-(Army Effort)
Aquila was an Army UAV acquisition effort originally begun in 1979 and designed to provide ground commanders with real-time intelligence on enemy troop locations beyond the line-of-sight of friendly forces. Originally estimated to cost just over one half billion dollars for development and procurement of 780 air vehicles, the program was abandoned in 1987 due to schedule and technical difficulties as well as excessive program costs. 5 The technical difficulties, in all fairness to Aquila are due, at least in part, to the effects of "requirements creep" on its acquisition effort. 6 In other words, as the development of the system progressed, additional requirements were added for the system to perform. Originally designed to provide ground commanders the ability to "see over the next hill", Aquila was also saddled with the requirement of precision targeting.
However, by 1987 the program had run up a $1 billion dollar bill and had been successfully able to meet mission requirements on only 7 of 105 flights.
Pioneer UAV (Navy Effort)
The second major post-Vietnam UAV acquisition effort, Pioneer, was initiated by the Navy in the early 1980's. Produced jointly by American and Israeli firms, Pioneer bypassed the normal development phase of the acquisition cycle with nine systems, each with eight air vehicles, procured by the Navy for naval gunfire spotting and to provide the Marine Corps with a tactical UAV capability. 9 Original procurement costs in 1986 of 72
Pioneer air vehicles and associated ground equipment was estimated at $87.7 million dollars. 10 Technical difficulties with shipboard recovery however, led the Navy to invest an additional $50 million dollars to bring the system up to "minimum essential capability." 11 The Gulf War in 1991 soon tested Pioneer's capabilities.
Pioneer Operational Performance
Despite a less-than-stellar performance in development, during the Gulf War, the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy fully utilized Pioneer for tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) purposes. The US Army capitalized on information gathered by Pioneer UAVs to target Iraqi artillery as the US Army made its initial push north during the ground war. 12 The Marine Corps used imagery gathered by their UAVs to supply aviators with updated target imagery. 13 In addition, it was Pioneer
UAVs that supplied Marines with the initial warning of the Iraqi probing attack into the Saudi Arabian town of Khafji. 14 Finally, the Navy, launching UAVs off its ships, used the gathered information to identify shore targets for artillery fired from its boats. Begun in 1988, the program was estimated to cost $1.2 billion for 400 Hunter air vehicles and other required operating equipment. 23 By 1995 however, the expected cost would nearly double. Though the system demonstrated difficulties in relaying images through a second airborne vehicle (required due to range driven line-of-sight limitations), DOD awarded a contract for low rate initial production (LRIP) of seven systems, consisting of eight air vehicles each, in 1993. 24 Upon delivery however, deficiencies in software, data link, and engines were revealed. 25 Finally, several crashes in rapid succession led DOD to allow the program to terminate by contract expiration in early 1996. 26 Subsequently, the Army retained one system for limited testing and development and put the rest of the already produced models into storage. Performance of Hunter during advanced war fighting experiments in 1997 rejuvenated some support for the system, but as of yet most of the systems remain mothballed. 27 Building on the consolidation of acquisition efforts into one office, the JPO, DOD continued work to improve the acquisition and development of UAVs as well as other "high tech" systems through implementation of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) process.
ACTD Process
The ACTD process was spawned in an effort to streamline the acquisition and development of systems throughout DOD. 28 With an ACTD, a small number of systems are acquired outside the normal acquisition channels for testing and development by operators. 29 This testing and development phase may include operational use of the system to verify performance capabilities. 30 The ACTD process is advantageous to the acquisition and development effort for at least two reasons. First, operators with firsthand knowledge of system requirements are in on the testing and development of a system in it's infancy. 31 Second, the ACTD process allows DOD to procure a system for testing while "doing away with much of the paperwork and oversight normally associated with the acquisition process." showed that the system can be adversely affected by unfavorable weather conditions."
In defense of Predator, however, some may have misconstrued Predator's early deployments to Albania and Bosnia, and subsequent weather problems, as an operational capability when in fact the system was still in ACTD. 40 As the proponents of the ACTD process intended, one might expect a "learning curve" during a technology demonstration phase.
For better or for worse, in 1996 the Air Force assumed operational control of the remaining ACTD assets and Predator transitioned to LRIP with 20 systems in mind for a total of 80 air vehicles (four air vehicles per system). 41 This number was subsequently cut back to 12 systems, with the total number of air vehicles yet to be determined.
Supporting and flying the Predator through the ACTD and still today is the 11th
Reconnaissance Squadron, the first Air Force operational UAV Squadron, activated in
July of 1995 at Indian Springs Auxiliary Field, Nevada.
USAF "Hands Off UAV Course
As early tactical UAV programs struggled, Air Force involvement in the development of these programs was conspicuously lacking. Of the five UAV systems just outlined-representing an abridgement of DOD tactical UAV efforts from 1980 to early 1990-only Predator had significant USAF involvement in its testing and development. In fact, of seven DOD UAV programs-representing all DOD UAV efforts during this timeframe-still only Predator had significant USAF involvement in its development. 44 In the authors opinion, lack of significant involvement in UAV development prior to the mid-1990s indicates a lack of early USAF interest in UAVs. The highest payoff applications in the near-term are Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR), and communications. A dedicated Air Force UAV squadron will focus on operating the Predator mediumrange surveillance UAV, which also will serve as a testbed for developing concepts for operating high altitude, long endurance UAVs. In the midterm, the Air Force expects that suppression-of-enemy-air-defense (SEAD) missions may be conducted from UAVs, while the migration of additional missions to UAVs will depend upon technology maturation, affordability and the evolution to other forms of warfare. In "theory" both systems should provide a variety of theater-wide capabilities; however, in "practice" both systems have exhibited difficulties.
New Found USAF UAV Interest

HAE UAV ACTD Setbacks
Global Hawk's progress to date has been characterized by schedule slips and cost overruns. Originally scheduled for its first flight in February of 1997, Global Hawk's maiden flight was slipped to late fall 1997. 9 Slipping further, the air vehicle subsequently flew its maiden flight in February 1998. 10 In addition to schedule slips, Global Hawk has not been immune to cost overruns. Lack of system performance, due in part to contractor oversold capabilities, required an additional $110 million dollars to be added to the program in an attempt to keep it on track. 11 According to Mr Tom Hydock, formerly with DARO, contractors at times can paint a "pretty picture" to sell a system but disappoint when performance lacks. 12 Meanwhile DOD is left to make the decision to ante up funds to keep the program alive or cut its losses and run. However, in defense of Global Hawk oversold systems are neither new nor unique to UAVs. 13 one tenth of the $3.5 billion required to maintain the current course for UAV End States 1 through 3 is currently funded. 16 In addition, the Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
for FY 00 is currently under review; most affected during this cycle is End State 1-developing a HAE ISR UAV. 17 With the HAE UAV ACTD and its associated funding ending in December of 1999, HAE UAV operational infrastructure costs associated with meeting End State 1 shift to USAF and fall in the current POM cycle. 18 However, the End State 1 office of primary responsibility, Air Combat Command, is reluctant to ante up the funds in light of HAE UAV progress. 19 Lack of funding driven largely by poor HAE UAV performance, in turn, has affected USAFs ability to achieve the end state timelines.
In a recent HQ USAF/XO briefing, the impact of funding shortfalls and HAE UAV schedule slips produced recommendations to slip the original timelines for End States 1 through 3. 20 The adjustments are summarized below. 
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to provide a logical argument supporting a moderate USAF UAV course based on proven technology and conservative investment
In support of this argument, the paper first provided a chronology of five UAV programs representing an abridgement of DOD tactical UAV development and acquisition efforts during the 1980s and early 1990s. The purpose of the chronology was two-fold. First, the UAV chronology allowed the reader to develop sufficient perspective of the sub-par evolution of UAV capabilities, technology, and development. Second, the chronology depicted a conspicuous lack of USAF involvement in most of these tactical UAV programs indicating a lack of early UAV interest on the part of the Air Force.
Admitted reluctance by senior USAF leadership to accept UAVs to meet mission needs provided concrete evidence supporting a USAF "hands off approach to UAVs during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Next, despite the sub-par performance of previous UAV systems, the paper This paper recommends USAF adopt the moderate UAV course.
